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1. Introduction 
Access to irrigation water is one of the most important factors in modern agricultural 
production. It offers opportunities for improving livelihoods particularly in rural areas as 
access to reliable good quality irrigation reduces the cost and increases the quantum of 
production by reducing the risks faced by the rain fed agriculture. In agricultural water 
distribution, equity is limited to allocation and receipt of irrigation water. Equity means 
fairness in creating fair access to water for all, both within and between communities and 
within and between regions. Since more than 60% of the irrigated area is under 
groundwater and is fast increasing with time, the equity in access to groundwater is of 
great concern. It is noteworthy to mention that in the Indian context water allocation 
principles refer to ‘proportionate equality’ and ‘prior appropriation’. The former operates 
in the existing inequality of land ownership and the later generates inequality through 
uses (Pant 1984).  
By the very nature of the resource, groundwater development is largely by private 
initiative of farmers which is conditioned by their size of land holding, savings and 
investment capacities. Because of this reason in the first phase of groundwater 
exploitation, the poor invariably got left out in the race for groundwater irrigation and 
decades later when they began to enter groundwater economy a set of new rules and 
regulations like licensing, sitting rules and groundwater zones made their entry difficult 
in most areas and impossible in those areas where groundwater overdraft was high (Shah 
1993). With intensive groundwater exploitation, declining water tables have further 
reduced access to groundwater irrigation to a large number of small and marginal farmers 
who can neither use traditional techniques nor are able to use ‘lumpy’ new technology so 
as to pump water at an economic price. Moreover, chasing water table is beyond the reach 
of resource poor farmers. In such conditions they have to depend on the other well 
owners for groundwater irrigation. This has severe equity implications especially in a 
situation where farmers have little opportunity to earn their income from sources other 
than irrigated agriculture (Dhawan 1982). Thus in the process, the race to exploit 
groundwater resource is exponentially continued by the haves and the have-nots continue 
to bear the brunt of this negative externality (Nagraj and Chandrakanth 1997). As a 
consequence, there emerges widespread apprehension that, instead of reducing relative 
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inequalities among rural incomes, groundwater irrigation development may actually have 
enlarged both the absolute and relative inequalities already prevalent (Shah 1987 and 
Shah 1993). Many micro level studies have also highlighted these serious equity 
implications of groundwater exploitation with falling water levels particularly in the 
water-starved regions (Shah 1991, Bhatia 1992, Monech 1992, Nagraj and Chandrakanth 
1997). While groundwater availability can be studied from an earth science perspective 
but to analyse its accessibility one needs deeper understanding of groundwater economy 
and its underlying socio economic dynamics.  
The policy design aimed to achieve food security of the country in the sixties encouraged 
“grain revolution” with increasing area under water intensive rice-wheat cropping pattern 
in the Green Revolution belt making Punjab the ‘Bread basket’ of the country. During this 
time, the modern agricultural practices of HYV technology in Punjab also ushered in the 
shift from canal irrigation to tube-well irrigation as it was a more reliable and flexible source 
of irrigation and this gave boost to enormous increase in agricultural production. In the 
early phase of Green Revolution, rapid diffusion of groundwater technology was thus 
appreciated on grounds of it being economically superior to other sources of irrigation in 
terms of its efficacy and productivity (Dhawan 1975). The superiority of this irrigation 
source continued to enhance the intensive cultivation of water intensive crops on an 
extensive scale not withstanding the hydro-geological thresholds of this resource. 
Consequently the over exploitation of groundwater inevitably questions the accessibility of 
this resource and rises serious concerns about the equity in its distribution.  
Literature highlighting the superiority of the modern water extraction machines has been 
too preoccupied with highlighting the superiority from individual or private point of view 
which only focuses on economic justification and economic efficiency without considering 
the economic equity. It should be noted that economic efficiency begins to introduce a 
concern for equity that was missing in economic justification, in the specification that the 
increase in welfare of one individual should not be at the expense of another. The economic 
justification although assures enough benefits generated to cover all the costs but do not 
take into account the economic equity criterion which requires the costs to be allocated in 
proportion to benefits received (Abu-Zeid 2001).   
In this broader context, the paper examines three aspects inequity in access to groundwater 
irrigation across different classes of farmers in different phases of groundwater depletion in 
Punjab.  The study analyses the external diseconomies in groundwater utilization in terms 
of its accessibility to groundwater irrigation to large farmers vis-à-vis the small and 
marginal farmers. Firstly, it looks into the determinants of groundwater accessibility. 
Secondly, it empirically shows the difference in the physical and economic accessibility of 
groundwater resource and thirdly it evaluates the consequences of unequal access to 
groundwater irrigation by analysing the inequity in net returns to agriculture among 
agricultural communities dependent on groundwater irrigation.   
Since depletion is a phenomenon, to capture the effects of groundwater depletion, in this 
study three villages are chosen from the same agro-climatic region with different levels of 
groundwater depletion. Three hundred households are interviewed from each village to 
collect field level data for the analysis. Table 1 gives the profile of the three study villages 
and figure 1 shows their locations.    
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Name of the Village Tohl Kalan Gharinda Ballab-e-Darya 
Slope Gentle Gentle Gentle 
Prevalent Soil Type Alluvial Alluvial Alluvial 
Average depth of water table 
below 
12 meters 18 meters 46 meters 
Type of irrigation Mixed Groundwater Groundwater 
Sources of Irrigation 
canals – 43 % 
tube-wells – 57 % 
tube-wells – 100 
% 
tube-wells – 100 % 
Cropping Intensity (%) 204 217 178 
Table 1. Profile of Study Areas 
2. Determinants of groundwater accessibility  
Studies have indicated that ownership and access to groundwater irrigation has almost 
replaced land in determining one’s socio-economic and political status (Janakarajan S. 1993). 
In the groundwater dependant societies, the struggle for access to, and control over 
groundwater, shapes the course of agrarian change and development (Dubash 2002). 
Certain factors which govern the ownership of groundwater are central to understanding 
changes in access to groundwater over time. Under British common law, the basic civil law 
doctrine governing property ownership in most of India, groundwater rights are 
appurtenant to land (Singh 1992). If a person owns a piece of land, he/she can drill or dig a 
well and can pump out as much groundwater as he/ she is able for use on overlying lands. 
When land is sold the groundwater access rights pass with the land and can not legally 
separated from it. At present, groundwater rights are defined by the ability to chase water 
tables and ability to invest in changing water technology. If one can afford to deepen ones 
well, the water pumped out from it is theirs (Moench 1992). Groundwater accessibility is 
thus largely depend on a wide interplay of interconnected factors like land holding size, 
type and nature of ownership of tube-wells, productivity of tube-wells and density of tube-
wells. The following section analyses the interplay of these dynamic factors among various 
size classes of farmers at different levels of groundwater depletion to understand the 
variability of groundwater accessibility with continuous resource depletion.         
2.1 Land ownership and accessibility to groundwater  
The distribution of land ownership and the extent of land subdivision and fragmentation 
affect the development and use of groundwater. Jairath (1985) argues that fragmentation of 
landholdings has led to underutilization of privately owned tube-wells in Punjab. Thus 
large farms may more beneficially utilize groundwater irrigation structures than the small 
ones. Moreover the higher farm productivity of large farms also facilitate the greater 
investments in buying and maintaining tube-well technology which is essential for 
continued accessibility of groundwater irrigation (Dubash 2002). Inequalities in the 
ownership of water extraction machines are closely related to the inequalities in land 
ownership and the inequalities in land and water ownership are seen to compound each 
other (Bhatia 1992). Thus the pattern of land ownership inevitably influences the farmers’ 
ability to access groundwater and since availability of groundwater varies according to the 
levels of the existing water table, it is important to examine how different land holding 
categories at different levels of resource depletion differ in access to groundwater irrigation.    
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Fig. 1. Location of Study Areas 
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If we accept land as a reasonably good indicator of power in agrarian societies, then all the 
sample villages are societies with deep inequalities of power (Table – 2). Landownership 
and land operation through tenancy are linked in a way that they defy easy separation.  
Studies show that in Punjab “reverse tenancy” is a common phenomenon under which 
small and marginal farmers lease out land on cash terms to the medium and large farmers 
who have sufficient capital and have made investment in machinery and in water extraction 
machines (Siddhu 2002). A careful examination (Table–3) reveals that reverse tenancy is  
 
Land owned 
(acres) 
Mixed Irrigation 
Village 
(Tohl Kalan) 
Tube-well 
Irrigation Village 
(Gharinda) 
Tube-well Irrigation Village with 
Problems of Depletion 
(Ballab-e-Darya) 
1 - 2 18 4 32
2 - 4 26 6 15
4 - 10 38 32 32
more than 10 18 58 21
Total 100 100 100
Source: Questionnaire surveys in various villages from May to July, 2009 
Table 2. Land Ownership by Different Classes of Farmers (Percentages) 
 
Land 
owned 
(acres) 
%  of 
households in 
each group
% of 
households 
leasing in
% of 
households 
leasing out
leased in area 
as % of 
operated area
leased out area 
as % of 
operated area 
Mixed Irrigation Village (Tohl Kalan)
1 - 2 18 11 6 9 21 
2 - 4 26 23 0 11 0 
4 - 10 38 13 0 6 0 
more 
than 10 
18 50 0 28 0 
Total 100 22 1 18 2 
Tube-well Irrigation Village (Gharinda)
1 - 2 4 0 0 0 0 
2 - 4 6 0 0 0 0 
4 - 10 32 9 0 5 0 
more 
than 10 
58 17 2 5 9 
Total 100 13 1 5 7 
Tube-well Irrigation Village with Problems of Depletion (Ballab-e-Darya) 
1 - 2 32 0 28 0 29 
2 - 4 15 0 7 0 9 
4 - 10 32 13 0 5 0 
more 
than 10 
20 20 0 16 0 
Total 100 8 10 10 2 
Source: Questionnaire surveys in various villages from May to July, 2009 
Table 3. Incidence of Tenancy by Landownership (percentage of land leased out to total land 
owned by each group) 
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prevalent in the sample villages and it is also more pronounced in the tube-well irrigated 
village of Ballab-e-Darya indicating close correspondence of this phenomenon with 
groundwater depletion.  
Field observations reveal, in the tube well irrigated regions of Punjab, the small farmers who 
do not have their own source of irrigation and are also not in a position to buy water for 
irrigation are compelled to lease out their land to the large farmers especially in the kharif 
season when there is acute water scarcity on account of rice cultivation1. In spite of much 
exploitation, farmers prefer leasing out land in kharif season because it is still more 
profitable than rain-fed maize cultivation. The value of the land is calculated purely on the 
basis of availability of water supply for irrigation which in turn depends on the number of 
wells in that particular land, its depth and the capacity of the pump used to pump out 
water. It was seen that land endowed with sufficient groundwater irrigation was leased out 
at Rs 16,000 to Rs 20,000 per acre and land without any source of water was leased out for Rs 
6,000 to Rs.8, 000.  
Very exploitative tenancy relations were also common in lands without any water extraction 
machines. In such cases the owner (mostly small or marginal farmers) pays for all the inputs 
like seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, labour and the produce is divided equally between the 
owner and the tenant. The tenant who is a large land lord only provides with the irrigation 
water and takes away half of the produce. Thus, ownership of groundwater determines the 
terms and conditions of tenancy in groundwater depleted regions in Punjab. These indicate 
that with groundwater depletion, water becomes the most important factor of cultivation 
and even its importance exceeds that of land. In such groundwater dependant societies, land 
has no value unless it is endowed with water extraction machines and the bargaining power 
is also in the hands of those who own water along with land and not only land. Thus, there 
is a complete shift of power relation from the hands of ‘landlords’ to ‘waterlords’.  
The control and access over groundwater offers scope for interlinkages between ownership 
of land and water. Such ‘interlinked contracts’ have been observed for land, labour and 
credit, and similar contractual forms in the provision of irrigation may be an additional 
mechanism of marginalising resource poor to groundwater access. The link between credit 
and groundwater has several possible implications. Usurious credit relations driven by 
groundwater related investment, carry the potential for a long term debt trap. They also 
allow a creditor to dictate production decisions especially the decisions of cropping pattern. 
Creditors are mostly landowners, leading to credit relations being ‘interlinked’ with land 
and water arrangements in various combinations. In the villages of Punjab, such interlinked 
‘land-water-credit markets’ were very common especially in regions of acute depletion. 
Interlinkages between these three important determinants of cultivation have lead to sever 
consequences in accessibility to groundwater irrigation and hence a profitable agriculture. 
Institutional credit is not available to set up new tube-wells and land without water can not 
be cultivated. Farmers owning smaller assets (lands) thus often fall prey to local money 
lenders. As cost of inputs increase with time, credits become a necessary condition to sustain 
cultivation. The farmers owning small land holdings without any water extraction machine 
have no alternative option but to take loan from local money lenders or lease out or sell out 
                                                 
1 Rice and maize are grown in Kharif season. But the relative profitability of growing rice is much 
higher than maize. This is a half yearly lease.  
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his land. Thus, the interlinking of credit, land and water leads to much greater exploitation 
of the less endowed farmers and in the process they lose their land and turn into 
agricultural labourers or construction workers in urban areas from a cultivator.  
2.2 Ownership of wells and access to groundwater  
In agrarian societies heavily reliant on irrigated agriculture, control over water is an 
essential complement to landownership (Dubash 2002). Available evidences in literature 
indicate strong positive correlation between land holding size and ownership of modern 
water extraction machines (Shah 1988) which is also true in all the three sample villages 
(Table - 4). Since the development of a well for irrigation requires substantial investments, it 
is largely affordable by the resource rich farmers who are also the large landlords. This 
implies that better access to land is associated with the better access to groundwater. Along 
with this, the inequality in the distribution of operational tube-wells is most pronounced in 
the groundwater depleted village because with receding water tables more numbers of wells 
of small and marginal farmers dry up as they have no capital to chase water table. Positive 
correspondence with landholding size and average depth of tube wells and average land 
irrigated per bore well reiterating the same findings (Table - 4). Thus, along with the 
inherent inequality of tube-well ownership influenced by the unequal distribution of land 
ownership, groundwater depletion further increases the skewedness in the ownership of 
tube-wells.  
 
Particulars 
Marginal 
Farmer 
Small 
Farmer 
Medium 
Farmer 
Large 
Farmer 
Total 
Mixed Irrigation Village (Tohl Kalan)
Average no of operational tube-
wells (feet) 
0.72 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.94 
Average Depth of tube well 180 191 231 421 249 
Average land irrigated per bore 
well (acre) 
4.42 7.05 12.99 40.56 15.50 
Tube-well Irrigation Village (Gharinda)
Average no of operational tube-
wells (feet) 
1.00 1.00 1.06 1.34 1.22 
Average Depth of tube well 120 185 210 217 209 
Average land irrigated per bore 
well (acre) 
2 4 7 13 10 
Tube-well Irrigation Village with Problems of Depletion (Ballab-e-Darya) 
Average no of operational tube-
wells (feet) 
0.41 1.00 0.91 1.80 0.94 
Average Depth of tube well 120 185 210 217 209 
Average land irrigated per bore 
well (acre) 
2 4 7 13 10 
Source: Questionnaire surveys in various villages from May to July, 2009 
Table 4. Tube Well Ownership and Area of Influence of Tube Wells across Farm Size Classes 
(Change into percentage) 
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Moreover, the poor farmers even after owning wells may be trapped in a regime of low well 
yields as not only water table is receding progressively but also many new wells are dug2. 
Because of declining water tables and increasing density of wells, it is difficult to access a 
new location to fix up a new well which is a necessary condition to avoid well interference 
and hence have a productive well. Large farmers owning large plots of land have greater 
opportunity to space his wells. On the contrary, the small and marginal farmers have little 
option to get a suitable place to dig his well as he owns a small fragment of land and very 
often he is a late initiator of the tube-well technology and the neighbouring plots already 
have deep tube-wells.       
2.3 Nature of ownership of wells and access to groundwater  
In Punjab, some of the most important factors affecting access to groundwater irrigation 
include whether wells are owned solely by individuals or held jointly. It is seen that the 
average individual ownership of tube-wells is much higher for large landowners than the 
marginal and small land owners (Table -5). The strong preference of individual ownership 
of tube-wells despite the higher costs involved reflects that individual exploitation of water 
even at higher costs is sufficiently productive to be economical. Individuals may also be 
prepared to bear higher costs because of difficulties in ensuring effective joint ownership 
and management of wells, and the risks depending on purchases from other tube-well 
owners. In conditions of continuous groundwater mining even available supplies are 
inadequate to meet the demand of the area served by an aquifer, these constraints become 
more severe (Janakarajan and Moench 2006). This fact is also reinforced by the much higher 
average number of sole ownership of tube-wells in the groundwater depleted village of 
Ballab-e-Darya than in the other two villages (Table-).     
The incidences of hiring of tube-wells were not common phenomena in the villages because 
land and water extraction machines was considered as complementary resource and the 
leasing in and leasing out of land automatically resulted in the leasing in and leasing out of 
the tube-well in the respective land. Hiring of tube-wells also does not show any 
correspondence with land holding size. With groundwater depletion the farmers do not 
want to hire wells as disputes arise as to which party will deepen the well and repair the 
pump which becomes a hurdle for timely irrigation. The farmers, thus, prefer to lease out 
the entire land and tube-well to have complete control and responsibility of the tube-well. 
Due to these impediments of groundwater accessibility through hired tube-wells, hiring has 
become redundant in the villages of Punjab.   
Since tube wells are indivisive, with successive generation number of land holdings 
increase and the numbers of shareholders consequently increase in a family owned well. 
Sometimes even the partners (subsequently the heirs of the partners) of the old water 
extraction technology like hult3 continue to jointly irrigate and own wells. In many cases 
especially for newly owned joint wells, either the brothers and cousins or neighbouring 
farmers owning small fragments of (contiguous) land contribute jointly to install 
submersible pumps. Joint wells are commonly operated by installing a single pump set 
                                                 
2 With many wells, the density of tube-wells increases lowering the yield of the neighbouring wells. 
3 Hult was a traditional water extraction machine and it needed lot of labour (both animal and human) 
to irrigate land. As it was labour intensive families jointly owned and operated hults. 
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and running the motor in rotation between shareholders for a fixed number of hours. It 
helps them to share the cost and also fully utilize the chunk of economic investment for 
(jointly) irrigating the combined portion of land. With the incresing number of joint 
ownership of wells, the dilemma and uncertainties associated with management of jointly 
owned wells create varied nature conflicts within communities and families which is 
important to analyse as it revolves round several issues of equity to accessibility of 
irrigation water among the shareholders.     
 
Land Holding Category Solely Owned 
Tube-Wells 
Hired 
Tube-
Wells 
Jointly owned 
Tube-Wells 
operational 
Tube-Wells 
Mixed Irrigation Village 
(Tohl Kalan) 
No %age No %age No %age No %age 
Marginal Farmer 7 9 5 28 12 29 16 16 
Small Farmer 22 28 6 33 11 26 26 27 
Medium Farmer 32 41 3 17 14 33 38 39 
Large Farmer 17 22 4 22 5 12 18 18 
Total no of wells 78 100 18 100 42 100 98 100 
Tube-well Irrigation 
Village (Gharinda)
            
Marginal Farmer 4 3 0 0 0 0 4 3 
Small Farmer 6 5 0 0 0 0 6 5 
Medium Farmer 31 26 0 0 3 100 34 28 
Large Farmer 77 65 1 100 0 0 78 64 
Total no of wells 118 100 1 100 3 100 122 100 
Tube-well Irrigation Village with Problems of Depletion (Ballab-e-Darya)   
Marginal Farmer 7 9 0 0 4 27 13 14 
Small Farmer 5 7 0 0 10 67 15 16 
Medium Farmer 28 37 0 0 1 7 29 31 
Large Farmer 36 47 0 0 0 0 36 39 
Total no of wells 76 100 0 0 15 100 93 100 
Source: Questionnaire surveys in various villages from May to July, 2009 
Table 5. Types of Tube Well Ownerships across Farm Size Classes 
Data reveals that joint ownership of wells mostly rests with small and marginal farmers 
(Table-5). Large farmers mostly have wells under individual ownership. In some cases 
they consolidate their shares in the wells by purchasing from other shareholders. A 
positive correspondence is also noted for incidence of joint ownership and groundwater 
depletion (Table - 5). With depletion, the running cost of groundwater irrigation increases 
as continuous deepening becomes mandatory to sustain tube-well irrigation. In  
such situations the joint ownership helps the small and marginal farmers to share the  
cost and have access to groundwater irrigation. The cost of the well is borne by all  
the share holders in proportion to the number of shares they own and the proportion of 
the land they will be irrigating with the help of the shared water extraction machine.  
In cases where the shareholders don’t cover their proportion of the costs, they are 
excluded from use of the pump set. If a shareholder voluntarily withdraws his share  
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from a joint well the remaining shareholders contribute money to take out his share.  
The maintenance and deepening of the well is also jointly done by all the share  
holders.  
In reality, however, the cost benefit sharing of the jointly owned wells are much more 
complex. While the details of the management of jointly owned wells for every case is not 
documented in detail, but interviews suggest that the incidence of conflict in the process 
of sharing of water from jointly owned wells is widespread and that practical difficulties 
surrounding pumping and management of shares and ownerships are of the most 
important source of conflict which often results in differential access between dominant 
owners and others who are less capable of exercising their partial ownership rights. 
Where scarcity is an issue, rights are likely to come in conflict. Conflicts among the 
shareholders are common regarding the number, spacing and time of the ‘turns’4 in 
irrigating their respective farms. The disputes are countless during the kharif season 
when virtual scarcity of water increases with cultivation of rice. Many disputes also arise 
due to the erratic power supply5, which disrupts schedules for sharing available pumping 
time. Village panchayats (informal village courts) are often involved in resolving such 
disputes but conflicts continue to resurface in the next period of scarcity. Many disputes 
are only resolved when one shareholder buys the others out. In some cases this is 
accomplished by poor farmers selling their land along with their shares in a well. In 
addition disputes often occur over the need to deepen wells. Shareholders with different 
land holdings disagree regarding the distribution of the benefits from well deepening and 
one or more refuses to contribute to the cost. There are also instances of cases where wells 
are abandoned due to prevalence of too many shareholders and the emergence of 
numerous disputes. Conflicts were even noticed in cases where farmers voluntarily 
wanted to take out his share for reasons like migrating to urban areas or abroad, changing 
occupation, buying land somewhere else or even setting up individual well. The 
shareholders do not agree to pay for the withdrawn share in the joint wells. In such cases, 
the individual (who wants to leave the partnership) either goes without getting his share 
paid or sell off his land. Conflicts in crop selection were also common where some 
shareholders wanted to grow some other crop but could not do so because of the 
collective decision of the shareholders. In well sharing per person availability of water 
also declines (especially with incessant falling of water tables), the shareholders have to 
wait for their turns to irrigate their crop. This reduces the quality of irrigation as both 
availability and the control over the water supply decline.   
While sharing of water from a joint well is often problematic, positive features also exist. 
The fact that about 62 % of the jointly owned wells are accessed by farmers owning less that 
4 acres of land indicates greater groundwater accessibility to the small and marginal farmers 
through this system. In the villages there are informal rules governing the sharing of costs 
and benefits from a jointly owned well and village panchayats play a role in redressing 
disputes. Thus, joint ownership system promotes accessibility to groundwater irrigation and 
particularly benefits those who can not afford a well of their own because of lack of resource 
                                                 
4 A specific number of hours and a specific time are fixed for each shareholder to use the pump or the 
tube-well to irrigate his land.   
5 During the peak time of irrigation of rice (May – June) the electricity supply in the villages on an 
average varies from 6 to 8 hours.  
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and also due to ownership of small fragments of land. While many joint wells fail due to 
two interrelated reasons; declining groundwater levels and the lack of finances for well 
deepening etc., many joint well ownership also become successful in providing 
groundwater access to small and marginal farmers who join hands in the time of scarcity to 
jointly harness and share the benefits of this (groundwater) resource which would not have 
been possible with individual efforts (investments). Many farmers believe that joint 
ownership of wells for this very reason is a better solution for groundwater accessibility 
especially in times of depletion but feel that joint ownership among kins and friends do not 
materialize as their individual small land holdings are spaced at greater distances and since 
joint ownership requires adjustability and compatibility to avoid conflicts the farmers are 
not comfortable to become partners of just any (neighbouring plot’s) farmer. When the 
farmers of distant fields become partners in joint wells, disputes commonly arise as many 
farmers object to passing of irrigation pipes through their plots and mischievous incidences 
of damaging pipes and disrupting (stealing) water supplies takes place. In such cases when 
joint ownership of wells fails, they resort to buying water which not only becomes costly but 
also exploitative at times. While the share system (partially) promotes equity in access to 
groundwater, depletion reinforces inequality in the village societies where many joint 
owners become heavily indebted and are eventually forced to sell their shares along with 
their parcels of land.          
3. Equity to groundwater irrigation accessibility  
To examine the access to the groundwater resource, two parameters, namely, physical and 
economic access to the resource is discussed. The physical access to resource is the 
groundwater used by the farmers measured in volume (acre-hours); economic access is the 
cost per unit volume of water used/accessed. The equity to resource was examined by 
classifying the farmers in two ways – on the basis of holding size and on the basis of the 
different agro-ecosystems at different levels of resource depletion. It is evident that physical 
access to groundwater resource is skewed towards the higher landholding classes (Table- 6). 
The inequality to physical access to groundwater resource is due to the inequality to land 
holding sizes. If we negate the land holding factor and work out the physical access realised 
to groundwater resource on the basis of per unit of holding size for each class, we observe 
that the groundwater realised per acre of holding size is lowest in the groundwater depleted 
village of Ballab-e-Darya which indicates towards low yield of tube-wells due to progressive 
water table depletion. There is also inequality in water accessibility among marginal and 
large land holdings as farmers of  marginal and smaller land holdings are incapable for 
chasing water tables as fast as the resource rich farmers. The per acre accessibility of 
groundwater is almost same among the tube-well irrigation village of Gharinda where since 
the water table is comparatively at shallower depths, the farmers across all categories can 
access groundwater.  In the mixed irrigation village of Tohl Kalan the per acre accessibility 
to groundwater is low for the marginal farmers because most of them (marginal farmers) 
irrigate with canal water as investment in tube-well for small plots of lands are not 
economical and with availability of canal water it is also not a mandatory option. The other 
parameter of equity, the economic access to groundwater, is also more skewed towards the 
larger land holding groups (Table - 6). Thus on one hand there is worsening physical 
shortage of water for small and marginal farmers and on the other there is also a scarcity of 
economically accessible water. 
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Particulars Marginal 
Farmer 
Small 
Farmer 
Medium 
Farmer 
Large 
Farmer 
Mixed Irrigation Village (Tohl Kalan)     
Total water used across all farms (acre-hour) 
13208 
(3) 
46074 
(11) 
141384 
(34) 
219460 
(52) 
Water accessed per unit of holding size (acre-
hour/acre) 
403 593 601 817 
Economic accessibility of groundwater = acre-
hour of ground water per rupee of a 
motorised cost of well*  
48624 121872 258149 831172 
Economic accessibility of ground water per 
Rs. 1000 
49 122 258 831 
Tube-well Irrigation Village (Gharinda)     
Total water used across all farms (acre-hour) 
4126 
(1) 
13128 
(2) 
147850 
(18) 
646938 
(80) 
Water accessed per unit of holding size  
(acre-hour/acre) 
515.75 625.14 634.55 652.16 
Economic accessibility of groundwater =  
acre-hour of ground water per rupee of a 
motorised cost of well*  
64702 144432 306179 745554 
Economic accessibility of ground water per 
Rs. 1000 
64.70 144.43 306.18 745.55 
Tube-well Irrigation Village with Problems of Depletion (Ballab-e-Darya) 
Total water used across all farms (acre-hour) 
10702.5 
(3) 
27558 
(8) 
109765 
(31) 
210711 
(59) 
Water accessed per unit of holding size  
(acre-hour/acre) 
365.90 314.05 442.16 565.67 
Economic accessibility of groundwater =  
acre-hour of ground water per rupee of a 
motorised cost of well*  
21858.81 121194 227474 708611 
Economic accessibility of ground water per 
Rs. 1000 
21.86 121.19 227.47 708.61 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage to total and the cost is calculated as actual running cost incurred if 
diesel pumps were used 
Source: Questionnaire surveys in various villages from May to July, 2009 
Table 6. Equity to Groundwater Irrigation Accessibility for Farm Size Classes  
4. Equity in net returns from agriculture  
To examine the extent of inequity in access to groundwater irrigation, the extent of inequity 
of net returns per acre realized for different landholding size classes is taken as a proxy 
variable. Various measures of income inequality were estimated (Table-7) and is also 
presented in the Lorenz curve (figure-2). Inequality of agricultural return distribution is 
indicated by the degree to which the Lorenz curve departs from the diagonal line:  
the further the curve is from the diagonal line, the more unequal is the farm income 
distribution, and vice versa. For all these measures as well as the Lorenz curve, it can be  
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Inequity measures 
Mixed 
Irrigation 
Village 
(Tohl Kalan)
Tube-well 
Irrigation 
Village 
(Gharinda) 
Tube-well Irrigation 
Village with Problems of 
Depletion 
(Ballab-e-Darya) 
Total of all 
samples 
Gini concentration 
ratio (GCR) 
0.070 0.008 0.218 0.099 
Theil Entropy index 0.039 0.003 0.040 0.028 
Standard deviation 
of logarithmic 
income 
1.006 0.204 1.687 0.966 
coefficient of 
variation 
0.444 0.270 0.544 0.420 
Source: Authors own calculation 
Table 7. Measures of Income Inequality in Different Sample Villages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of Net Returns to Cultivation 
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concluded that the net returns realized by farmers using groundwater irrigation in Gharinda 
is more evenly distributed than and in Ballab-e-Darya where there is problems of 
groundwater depletion. This is due to the more skewed access (distribution) to groundwater 
irrigation among the various classes of farmers in Ballab-e-Darya. Only a few marginal and 
small farmers have access to groundwater in Ballab-e-Darya on account of rising cost due to 
depletion. However it was not in case of Gharinda where groundwater accessibility was 
more equal. In Tohl Kalan the less inequality in net returns from agriculture was due to fact 
that a majority of small and marginal farmers who do not have tube-wells use canal water 
and have a large number of joint wells to supplement canal irrigation. A high proportion of 
marginal and small farmers being shareholders in joint wells in Tohl Kalan reduce 
inequality in resource among the different classes of farmers and thereby to irrigation 
surplus. But in Ballab-e-Darya due to deeper water tables and progressive receding of water 
table, the investment costs and maintenance of water yield in wells are very high. So the 
marginal and small farmers are fearful to go in for new bores on an individual as well as 
joint basis, thereby limiting their access to the resource. The non existence of any subsidiary 
source of irrigation other than tube-well irrigation further worsens the inequality in 
groundwater access and income distribution in Ballab-e-Darya. This shows that 
groundwater depletion plays a major role in inequitable distribution of groundwater 
irrigation access in a water scarce region like Punjab.           
5. Conclusion and policy implication 
The study reinforces the fact that growing inequity in access to groundwater leads to a 
process of continued social differentiation, which results in deprivation, poverty and the 
consolidation of inequitable power relations within local communities. Declining water 
levels and overexploitation of groundwater further leads to equity and sustainability 
problems and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. The immediate consequence of 
groundwater depletion is linked with the increasing cost of groundwater irrigation in terms 
of both capital and operating costs which is an increasing function of depth of water table. If 
the receding water table becomes a common phenomenon, the cost of groundwater 
irrigation rises in perpetuity. In case of considerable decline in water table, the external 
effect could not be only extra capital and operational costs but also lower farm output 
because of either reduced availability of water or lesser use of water at the enhanced cost of 
lifting it, or both. When the enhanced cost of water lifting exceeds the benefits from the use 
of such water for small farmers with traditional modes of groundwater irrigation that they 
are forced to give up irrigated farming altogether. Thus with continuous decline in the water 
table, the small and marginal farmers get deprived of groundwater or pay higher irrigation 
charges or they adjust their agriculture operations according to the accessibility of the water 
which largely depend on the tube-well owners who are generally large framers. This 
increase cost and severely affects the small farmers’ production in the long run.  
In the last twenty years gradual increase in groundwater access has undermined 
maintenance of canal irrigation systems Punjab which is evident from the government 
statistics which shows net area irrigated by canals has been declining and at present it is less 
than 27%. Field investigations reveal that the actual area under canal irrigation is further 
less as most of the canals have dried up and there is hardly any supply of canal water. Lack 
of maintenance of canal network and declining public investment in canal infrastructure 
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have consequently led to shrinking area under canal irrigation further compelling the 
farmers to increasingly depend on groundwater for irrigation. It seems that the subsidy in 
irrigation has shifted from canal subsidy to electricity subsidy in agriculture in Punjab to the 
extent that agricultural electricity is free in Punjab. In the process it has shifted the 
determinants of water access away from communities and into the hands of few resource 
rich individuals who can invest capital in upgrading water technology and continuously 
deepen wells with depletion.  
This has broader repercussions in the agricultural communities in Punjab. Firstly with an 
inherent inequality attached to groundwater ownership and accessibility on account of being 
privately initiated and monitored, the electricity subsidy consequently is disproportionately 
shared. But with declining water tables (for which large farmers are more responsible as they 
pump out more water and have large plots of land), the small and marginal farmers lose out 
on improvising their groundwater technology and competitive deepening and in the process 
get increasingly excluded form the financial grants (in this case free electricity) given by the 
government to facilitate the farmers to augment agricultural production. Secondly, when canal 
water is available in the villages, the small and marginal farmers (can at least) avail of 
irrigation water from canals or use canal water supplemented by tube-well water even when 
they do not own groundwater technology which (as of now)6 is entirely a private initiative to 
start with and maintain. So in such cases where canals exists, these marginalised farmers can at 
least use some form of government grant (the canal water subsidy) to augment production (if 
not the groundwater subsidy) rather than being completely deprived. But the irony is that, the 
canal water subsidy although exists, due to lack of maintenance, most of the canals have dried 
out leaving the farmers no option but to depend on groundwater for irrigation. Thirdly, since 
this (electricity subsidy) financial assistance is not ‘targeted’ it is (mis)appropriated by the 
wealthy and does not reach the needy farmers who actually require this support. Lastly, the 
electricity subsidy is enhancing groundwater depletion which in turn is enlarging the gap 
between the rich and the poor making the agriculture ecologically unsustainable and socially 
impoverished in Punjab.   
In the absence of surface water irrigation, groundwater withdrawals will tend to outstrip the 
groundwater recharge, with consequent downward pressure on the water table. In the 
presence of canal irrigation the pressure on water table eases in two ways: part of the 
demand for irrigation water shifts to canal water and seepage from unlined part of the canal 
network augments groundwater recharge. Thus a policy of simultaneous development of 
surface and groundwater irrigation will prevent permanent decline of water table in arid or 
semi-arid or low rainfall areas because of over-exploitation of groundwater which in the 
long run will also lead to sustainale agriculture. Sustainable water management should 
consider the environmental and equity issues and should cater to the needs of the poor and 
underprivileged who are generally marginal and small farmers. 
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